Go to Amb. Cohen’s JIPO page.

The year 2011 will undoubtedly be momentous for the Sudan, Africa’s largest country by area. It will be the sixth and final year of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 (CPA) signed by the central Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The latter is the political movement that engaged in a 30-year insurgency against the central government through its Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM/SPLA represents the 8 million Africans living in the southern third of Sudan. Their insurgency was motivated by central government repression, violence and the imposition on the mostly Christian southerners of Islamic practices in education, language and law.

The CPA, which was brokered largely by the Bush Administration, is a complex document, but the main points are as follows:

• A cease-fire in the thirty-year guerilla war;
• The establishment of the autonomous region of South Sudan with its own government, operating in parallel with the national government of Sudan (Government of South Sudan – GOSS);
• Establishment of a government of national unity (GNU) under President Bashir, with one northern and one southern Vice President;
• A six-year cooling off period during which the national government would make an effort to demonstrate to the southerners that maintaining one Sudan would be the best solution;
• A referendum in the south in which the people would decide whether they wish to remain part of a unified Sudan or become an independent state;
• A fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue during the transition in view of the fact that the producing oil fields straddle the north-south dividing line.

As of mid-2010, most analysts forecast that the 2011 referendum will call for the establishment of a new state in Southern Sudan. The people of Southern Sudan clearly do not feel that the Arab establishment that holds all of the power in Khartoum is willing to give them equal rights and equal access to the nation’s wealth. If that is indeed the case, what are the prospects for a relatively peaceful transition?

An analysis of the CPA indicates that the Arab government of Sudan does not have any interest in a stable transition to independence of the south. The main reason is that as much as 75 percent of Sudan’s oil reserves are located south of the north-side divide. If and when southern independence takes place, Khartoum’s revenues from oil could decrease considerably. In addition to oil revenues, both Khartoum and Cairo do not wish to see an additional independent state straddling the waters of the Nile in view of the river’s importance to both Sudan’s and Egypt’s national economic security.

What actions could Khartoum take to protect its interests in the south? They have a number of options.

Firstly, they could try to rig the southern referendum so that the requisite 60 percent of the voting age population in the south does not vote for independence. If this happens, the chances are strong that the GOSS will declare its independence unilaterally. Such an action could give rise to major instability and international problems, not to speak of potential armed conflict.

Second, in the event of a unilateral action by the South, Khartoum would most likely make a military grab for the oil producing regions immediately south of the north-south divide. The major thrust would be to take over the oil-rich sub-region of Abyei, which has a separate statute under the CPA. Abyei is required under the CPA to have its own separate referendum because of its mixed ethnic nature. A unilateral declaration of independence by the south and a land grab by the north would create a major dilemma for the African Union and the United Nations Security Council.

Thirdly, inside the south, there is still a lot of work to do in developing the institutions that will allow the south to have a viable functioning state. Despite large amounts of foreign aid, the southern regime is still far from ready. In addition, there is growing internal violent ethnic strife, some of it probably being financed and fomented from the outside. This requires the southern regime to spend a very high percentage of its oil revenue on security, as opposed to education, public health and infrastructure. The absence of social capital among the hundreds of ethnic groups, particularly those engaged in nomadic herding, is palpable and dangerous. This is especially true in view of the large quantity of arms available in the south after thirty years of guerilla war.

Fourth, in the event of Khartoum making a military grab for the oil producing areas, it could probably count on protection within the U.N. Security Council from China that would certainly veto any demands that it remove all troops from the disputed areas. If unilateral southern secession is considered “illegitimate,” then all legal bets are off for the entire CPA. The U.N. peacekeeping units already operating in the region would certainly not be given a mandate to use force.

Finally, within the African Union there would probably be chaos because it is a club of sitting heads of state. Normally, the members would support Khartoum as a sitting member against the newly secessionist regime of the south sitting in its capital city of Juba. On the other hand, southern Sudan’s neighbors, Kenya, Uganda and D.R. Congo, would probably clamor for recognition, along with Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and possibly others. It could turn into an Arab vs. African standoff.

What would be the options for the United States in the event of the type of worst case scenario described above? As the principal mediator in the negotiation of the CPA, the United States would probably insist on a return to the implementation of the CPA, and would make a major effort in the U.N. Security Council for action to force Khartoum to withdraw forces from southern territory, as well as to persuade the southern regime to rescind its unilateral action.

On the other hand, the administration would also come under heavy pressure from internal political opinion, especially from the evangelical and human rights communities, to recognize the independence of southern Sudan. An analogy to the unilateral secession of Kosovo from Serbia is relevant in the case of southern Sudan. The key thrust of U.S. policy would be to do everything possible to prevent a return to all-out war between the north and the south, but it is doubtful that Washington could resist extending recognition to an independent south.

The prevention of a return to war will probably be possible. But dealing with unilateral “facts on the ground” on the part of Khartoum will be difficult to handle. One possible compromise solution would be for the south and Khartoum to agree on a continuation of fifty-fifty oil revenue sharing for a fixed period of time after independence in order to allow final border demarcation to take place. Even after border demarcation, the north could earn considerable revenue from transporting southern oil through its pipeline. Such a deal could calm Khartoum’s angst, at least temporarily.

In the Sudan during 2011, the international community has to prepare for the worst while working assiduously to help the newly born independent southern state maintain stability as it faces both internal and external challenges.

I believe it is time to close the debate about AFRICOM. The command exists. It is operating, and it is growing in competence.

First, I do not fear that AFRICOM is likely to take over US policy in Africa. Nor do I believe that US policy toward Africa will be militarized. The core element of US policy toward Africa has never changed since the late 1950s. That is economic development. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have agreed on this core element.

The original designers of AFRICOM understood this, and skillfully included economic development elements in the command’s table of organization. That is why AFRICOM has a deputy commander slot for social and economic development that is filled by a US Ambassador assigned by the State Department.

If the core element of US policy toward Africa is, and always has been, economic development, what is AFRICOM’s role in this matrix? In this regard, I do not believe AFRICOM has yet developed a concept that will make it and integral part of the total USG effort in Africa.

Here is my recommendation:

The majority of African military establishments do not have a defined mission. In the old days of the one-party African dictatorship, the role of the military was to protect the government from internal threats. Since the advent of multiparty democracy in Africa, beginning in the early 1990s, the role of the African military has become ambiguous.

In countries under threat from outside, like Mali vs. el-Qaeda in the Maghreb, it is clear that the military has to be out there on counter insurgency operations most of the time. But in most African countries, there is no similar threat. So, how should they spend their time, apart from training?

My view is that the African military has to make a contribution to economic development, just like every other element of African society. The majority of the African people continue to live in rural areas. The African military should be out there in the rural areas partnering with the farmers in developmental activities.

The most obvious example is re-forestation. A regiment of soldiers can plant a lot of trees in one day. The rural peasants can agree to nurture the saplings until they become self-sufficient.

The military can also utilize engineering equipment to build and maintain farm-to-market roads, and construct small irrigation systems so that farmers can produce vegetables for marketing in the urban centers. When I was US Ambassador to Senegal during 1977 -1980, we used FMF for engineering equipment. The Senegalese army maintained the equipment beautifully, and used it to help the rural farmer earn higher incomes.

So, in my view, AFRICOM should talk to their African counterparts and discuss how they can work together to contribute to economic development. Projects do not have to be big, and I am sure funds will be available to support good ideas.

What counts in all of this, in my view, is mil-mil collaboration in useful projects. If this is successful, mil-mil collaboration at some point in joint security operations will be so much more productive.

One final point: AFRICOM should resist calls to establish its headquarters in Liberia. I disagree with former Assistant Secretary Jendayi Fraser’s recent article in the Wall Street Journal in which she urged AFRICOM to accept Liberia’s invitation. It’s not that AFRICOM will be able to operate more effectively from its current base in Stuttgart, Germany. What is important, is that AFRICOM’s physical presence on the African continent will provide an easy target for anti-American propaganda that will picture the US as neo-colonialist and militaristic. At a time when the French are cutting back on their military presence in Africa, it is no time for the US to start augmenting its presence.